Abstract. It is often the case in applications of cryptographic protocols that one party would like to determine a practical upper-bound on the physical distance to the other party. For instance, when a person conducts a cryptographic identi cation protocol at an entrance to a building, the access control computer in the building would like to be ensured that the person giving the responses is no more than a few meters away. The \distance bounding" technique we introduce solves this problem by timing the delay between sending out a challenge bit and receiving back the corresponding response bit. It can be integrated into common identi cation protocols. The technique can also be applied in the three-party setting of \wallets with observers" in such a way that the intermediary party can prevent the other two from exchanging information, or even developing common coin ips.
Introduction
A prover convincing a veri er of some assertion is a frequently recurring element in many applications of cryptography. One potentially useful such assertion is that the prover is within a certain distance. It seems that this problem has not been speci cally adressed, let alone solved in the literature. We introduce a technique called \distance bounding" that enables the verifying party to determine a practical upper-bound on the physical distance to a proving party.
In the literature, so-called \ma a frauds" have been adressed in which a party identi es himself to a verifying party using the identity of a third party, without that third party being aware of it. With our distance-bounding technique we can prevent these frauds as a special case.
Our distance-bounding protocols can be integrated with known public-key identi cation schemes, such that the veri er cannot obtain information that he could not have computed himself.
In the recently proposed setting of \wallets with observers," distance bounding can be incorporated in such a way that the verifying party can determine a practical upper-bound to the observer, whereas the intermediary party can prevent the other two parties from exchanging or developing information which can be used to compromise privacy. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the distancebounding principle. We introduce our solution in parts and then unify them.
In Section 3, we describe how distance bounding can be integrated into known public key identi cation schemes. In Section 4, we describe a problem in the setting of wallets with observers. We then show how to use the distance-bounding technique to solve it. A nal section ends this paper with some open problems.
Distance-bounding protocols
In this section, we rst present the basic distance-bounding principle. We then discuss ma a frauds and previously proposed countermeasures. We show how distance bounding can be used to prevent these frauds. We go on to show how distance bounding can prevent frauds in which a party having access to the secret keys convinces a verifying party that he is within a certain distance whereas he is not. Both protocols are then merged into one protocol that prevents both attacks.
The distance-bounding principle
The essential element of a distance-bounding protocol is quite simple. It consists of a single-bit challenge and rapid single-bit response. In practice, a series of these rapid bit exchanges is used, the number being indicated by a security parameter k. Each bit of the prover P is to be sent out immediately after receiving a bit from the veri er V. The delay time for responses enables V to compute an upper-bound on the distance.
What makes this approach really practical is that today's electronics can easily handle timings of a few nanoseconds, and light can only travel about 30cm during one nanosecond. For instance, even the timing between two consecutive periods of a 50 Mghz clock allows light to travel only three meters and back. (Later on we introduce exclusive-or operations on the bits exchanged, but 10113 chips have several such gates each with a throughput of two nanoseconds.)
Ma a frauds
A ma a fraud, rst described in 9], is a real-time fraud that can be applied in zero-knowledge or minimum disclosure identi cation schemes by fraudulent prover P and veri er V, cooperating together. It enables P to convince an honest veri er V of a statement related to the secret information of an honest prover P, without actually needing to know anything about this secret information. To this end, when P is about to perform the protocol with V, the latter establishes, say, a radio link with P, and will send any information transmitted to him by P straight on to P, who in turn sends it on to V. The same strategy is applied by P, who sends information received from V on to V, who in turn sends it on to P. In e ect, V and P act as a single transparent entity, sitting in the middle between P and V. This enables P to identify himself to V as being P, without any of P and V noticing the fraud. In Figure 1 , a ma a fraud is shown as it would be applied in the basic FiatShamir identi cation scheme (see 12]). In order to enhance readability of the gures, we de ne the subscript i to run over the set f1; : : :; kg, and computations are modulo n. In the most basic form of the Fiat-Shamir scheme P identi es himself to V by proving knowledge of a square root X of X 2 mod n, where X 2 mod n in some way is related to P's identity or has been published in a trusted directory. As usual, n is the product of two distinct primes.
In 9], Desmedt proposed a countermeasure to ma a frauds which requires P to sign a message that contains his physical location on earth, and then prove to V knowledge of the signature. Usually in an identi cation scheme, P will be represented by some user-module, so it will be impracticable to implement this solution without requiring position detection or cooperation of the user. Also, it cannot guarantee that the veri er in the long run does not learn anything about the secret key of the prover.
In 2], Beth and Desmedt propose that all transmission times be accurately measured. This seems to be useless owing to the signi cant possible variations in speed of computation.
In 1], Bengio et al suggested that V shield P's module from the outside world (e.g., in a Faraday cage) when the protocol takes place. This countermeasure requires trust by P that V does not secretly modify his module in some way while shielded. One would rather like to identify oneself in such a way that the module remains visible (an infrared channel would be even better, the usermodule never needing to leave the hands of the user). Futhermore, it requires special hardware equipment. 
Preventing ma a frauds using distance bounding
Consider how the distance-bounding principle can be used to prevent ma a frauds. We can assume that the distance between P and the fraudulent parties is not less than the accuracy that can be achieved with the apparatus being used, since otherwise obvious countermeasures can be taken. To ensure that the distance between V and the party P having access to the secret keys is measured, after the rapid bit exchanges have taken place the message formed by concatenating all the 2k bits sent back and forth in the distance-bounding stage is signed by P, using his secret key (see Figure 2 ):
Step 1 V generates uniformly at random k bits i , and P generates uniformly at random k bits i . (Note: this can take place well beforehand.)
Step 2 Now the low-level distance-bounding exchanges can take place. The following two steps are repeated k times, for i = 1; : : : ; k.
{ V sends bit i to P. { P sends bit i to V immediately after he receives i .
Step 3 P concatenates the 2k bits i and i , signs the resulting message m with his secret key, and sends the signature to V. We denote concatenation by the symbol\j." Now V can determine an upper-bound on the distance to P using the maximum of the delay times between sending out bit i and receiving bit i back, for i = 1; : : : ; k. V accepts if and only if P is close by, and the received signature is a correct signature of P on m = 1 j 1 j j k j k . Proposition 1. If the signature scheme is secure and P is not close by to V, then a ma a fraud has probability of success at most 1=2 k .
That is, the probability of successful cheating decreases exponentially in the number of repetitions of the rapid bit exchange. The simple proof of this proposition is very similar to the proof of Proposition 3 in the next section.
Preventing the prover from sending bits out too soon
In this subsection we study a setting in which P has access to the secret keys, and V wants to be ensured that P is close by. A remarkable thing about the distance bounding stage in the protocol of the previous subsection is that the bits that P sends to V do not have to depend on the bits that V sends to P. If P knows at what times V will send out bits, he can have V accept by sending i out to V at the correct time before he receives i , regardless of the distance to V.
Hence, the protocol we described for preventing ma a frauds does not prevent this fraud.
Two solutions suggest themselves. The rst solution consists of V sending bits out with randomly chosen delay times. Since P cannot anticipate when V expects to have received back a bit, he cannot send out bits i before he has received bit i (since V will not accept if a response bit i arrives before he has sent out bit i ). In fact, it is su cient if V sends out bit i at random at one of two discrete times, say, at the rising edge of clock pulse 3i or 3i + 1, for 1 i k. The probability of the strategy having success is at most 1=2 k if the choices are made independently.
The second solution consists of ensuring V that P must choose bits i depending on i . One way to do this involves creating a public bitstring m 1 j jm k once (the choice of the bits m i is irrelevant). The following protocol implements this (see Figure 3 ):
Step 1 V generates uniformly at random k bits i .
Step 2 Now the low-level distance-bounding exchanges can take place. The following steps are repeated k times, for i = 1; : : : ; k. { V sends bit i to P. { P sends bit i = i m i to V immediately after receiving bit i from V.
V veri es whether the bit-string ( 1 1 )j j( k k ) equals the public bitstring. If so, V computes an upper-bound on the distance to P using the maximum of the delay times between sending out bit i and receiving bit i back, for i = 1; : : : ; k. V accepts if and only if P is close by.
As before, it is easy to see that the probability that V accepts when P is not close by is at most 1=2 k .
Preventing both types of fraud
By combining the two protocols, we can prevent both types of fraud. As before, it is assumed that a bit-string m 1 j jm k is published. The following protocol can be used (see Figure 4 ):
Step 1 V generates uniformly at random k bits i . Fig. 3 . Preventing the response bits from being sent out too soon.
Step 2 P generates uniformly at random k bits m i . As before, both P and V can do so well beforehand. P commits to k bits m i using a secure commitment scheme.
Step 3 Now the low-level distance-bounding exchanges can take place. The following steps are repeated k times, for i = 1; : : : ; k.
{ V sends bit i to P. { P sends bit i = i m i to V immediately after he receives i .
Step 4 P opens the commitment(s) on the bits i by sending the appropriate information to V. P concatenates the 2k bits i and i , signs the resulting message m with his secret key and sends the resulting signature to V. With the information received in Step 4, V veri es whether the bits i i are indeed those commited to in Step 2. If this holds, then V computes m in the same way as P did and veri es whether the signature he received is indeed a correct signature of P on m. If so, he computes an upper-bound on the distance to P using the maximum of the delay times, and accepts if and only if P is close by.
Integration with public key identi cation schemes
The fact that a secure signature scheme must be used in the protocols of Subsection 2.3 and 2.5 can be a problem when the prover wishes only to identify himself by for example proving knowledge of a square root X of X 2 mod n (as in the basic Fiat-Shamir identi cation scheme): it is not clear how he should sign the message by using his secret information X; also, since V receives information that he could not have computed himself, it is not clear whether he obtains useful information for computing the secret keys. In this section, we show how to integrate distance bounding with known public key identi cation schemes such that no useful information is transferred. Fig. 4 . Distance bounding to prevent both types of fraud.
Preventing ma a frauds
To prevent ma a frauds, we have the distance-bounding protocol dictate that P respond to challenges formed as the exclusive-or of the bits sent and received, instead of signing the concatenation. We illustrate this with the basic FiatShamir scheme:
Step 1 P generates uniformly at random k numbers R i 2 Z n , and sends their squares R 2 i mod n to V. P also generates uniformly at random k bits i and commits to these bits (and their order) by sending a commitment on them to V.
Step 2 V generates uniformly at random k bits i .
Step 3 Now the low-level distance-bounding exchanges can take place. Hereto, the following steps are repeated k times, for i = 1; : : : ; k.
{ V sends bit i to P. { P sends bit i to V immediately after he receives i from V.
Step 4 P opens the commitment on the bits i made in Step 1 by sending the appropriate information to V. Furthermore, P determines the k responses X ci R i corresponding to challenges c i = i i , for 1 i k, and sends them to V. V determines the k challenges c i in the same way as P did, and veri es that the k responses are correct. Then V veri es whether the opening of the commitments by P is correct. If this holds, V computes an upper-bound on the distance to P Proposition 2. If the commitment scheme is secure, then this protocol is a proof of knowledge of a square root of X 2 mod n that does not reveal any useful information for computing a root of X 2 mod n.
Sketch of proof. In e ect, this protocol is the parallel version of the basic FiatShamir identi cation protocol. In 11] it is proven that this protocol reveals no useful information. Since the binary challenges are chosen mutually random, the veri er cannot choose them as the outcome of a collision-free hash-function of the information known to him before Step 2. That is, the veri er does not receive information that he cannot compute himself. In particular, the transcript of an execution of the protocol cannot be used as a digital signature to convince others that the execution took place. Proposition 3. If the commitment scheme is secure, P is not close by to V and both follow the protocol, then the ma a fraud has probability of success at most 1=2 k .
Sketch of proof. In order to have any chance at all of having V accept, the fraudsters P and V must perform the rapid bit exchange rst entirely with V and then with P (or vice versa), otherwise V will not accept because the computed upper-bound on the distance will not be tight enough (see Figure 6) .
However, since a commitment was sent in Step 2, it is clear that with prob- at least one di erent challenge (i.e. i i 6 = i i ). Therefore, at least one response of P is correct with respect to a challenge that is complementary to the challenge V expects a response to. Clearly, one cannot convert X c R to X c 1 R without knowing X.
Note that if at least one of P and V generates the challenge bits according to a distribution other than the uniform one (i.e., does not follow the protocol), this only increases the probability of successful cheating for P and V.
Although we had the prover commit himself, it does not really matter whether the prover or the veri er commits. This holds for the protocol in the next section as well. 
Preventing both types of fraud
In order to prevent both types of frauds, as in Subsection 2.5, one can straightforwardly modify this protocol. To this end, in Step 1 P commits to k bits m i , and in
Step 3 P will reply with response bits i = i m i . Finally, the responses of P in Step 4 must be computed with respect to the multi-bit challenge 1 j 1 j j k j k (using the concatenation of the xor-values does not prevent ma a frauds). This technique can be integrated in (minimum disclosure) identication schemes with multi-bit challenges, such as 5, 14, 15, 17], retaining the same security level for P. Observe that the same propositions hold for this modi ed protocol; the only distinction is that the challenge bits can be chosen as the outcome of a collision-free hashfunction, and hence the transcript can serve as a digital signature. Figure 7 shows how one might incorporate distance bounding into the Schnorr identi cation scheme. In this protocol, (p; q; g; h = g x mod p) is the public key of P(as in 17]).
Distance bounding in wallets with observers
Up to now, we have considered distance-bounding protocols in a model with two legitimate parties. In this section, we will discuss distance bounding in a certain three-party setting. The goal of V is to determine an upper-bound to P, and the task of the intermediary is to prevent undesired ow of information between P and V. Our technique allows the intermediary to prevent common coin ips between V and P. This can be thought of as a generalization of the \warden's problem" (see 18]). Recently, transaction systems based on \wallets with observers" have been proposed (see 6]). This setting can simultaneously o er privacy and security to an unprecedented extent. This is achieved by embedding within each user-module a tamper-resistant device called an observer. The observer is incorporated in a user-module in such a way that any message it sends to the outside world has to pass through the user-module. That is, the user-module acts as an intermediary party. The bene t of this setting is that one can design protocols such that the observer and the user-module both have to participate in order to have a veri er accept. In this way, a user cannot, say, double-spend the same coin in an electronic cash system since the observer will not participate a second time (see e.g. 3]).
Often, it will be su cient to prevent out ow (any information going from the observer to the veri er not speci ed by the protocol) and in ow (any information going from the veri er to the observer not speci ed by the protocol). In ow and in particular out ow can be a serious threat to the privacy of the user.
In 8] the privacy aspect of the wallet with observer setting has been investigated under an even more stringent requirement: even if an observer were to store all information it receives during the period it is embedded within a usermodule, it still should be impossible (independent of computing resources) to link a payment to a user by examining afterwards the information inside the observer and all information gathered by the verifying parties. This possibility is not excluded by preventing in ow and in ow, since for example a single random number known to both an observer and a shop would enable linking: the fact that the user-module took part in generating it (so that no information could be encoded within it, thus preventing both in ow and out ow) is irrelevant in this matter. That is, one must also prevent \common coin ips." In 8], the term \shared information" is proposed, encompassing in ow, out ow, and common coin ips. The essential technique (\divertability") needed to prevent shared information in such a setting has been proposed earlier by Desmedt in 9], and was generalized in 16]. Prevention of shared information in some instances can be viewed as a slight generalization of divertability, in that the keys have to be shared together with the intermediary in a suitable way.
A fraud that can be applied in this three-party setting is one in which a user illegitimately uses an observer embedded within someone else's wallet. A possible motivation for doing so is that typically observers will gather (part of) negative credentials which can prevent the user from doing transactions he would like to do (see e.g. 7]). Also, another observer might have (part of) certain positive credentials the user would like to make use of. One can imagine a fraudulent organization specializing in lending, at a distance, observers with positive credentials (or without certain negative ones) to users who are willing to pay for this. In e ect, when the user wants to do a transaction for which he needs certain positive credentials, he could use a radio link with the fraudulent organization and lets an appropriate observer authorize the transaction. We will call this the \observer fraud."
Preventing the observer fraud
Using our distance-bounding technique we show how the veri er in the threeparty setting can determine an upper-bound on the distance to the observer, such that the user-module can prevent shared information. We only describe one protocol that meets the most stringent requirements: no shared information, no release of useful information for computing the secret key, and the veri er obtains no information that he could not have computed himself (transcripts cannot serve as proof that the protocol took place). For easy comparison with the distance-bounding protocol shown in Section 3, our discussion will be based on the three party version of the Fiat-Shamir protocol (see 9, 16] ).
We need a new notion called a \xor-commitment scheme." This is a commitment scheme which enables one to commit to the exclusive-or of two bits and , whereas one only knows a commitment on but not itself. In addition, one should be able to open the xor-commit if and only if one knows how to open the commitment on , and this opening information must leak no Shannon information on the bits and , and the random choices involved in the commitment on .
An implementation of an xor-commitment scheme can be realized with RSA, based on the technique of probabilistic encryption (see 13]). Let n be a Blum integer. In order to encrypt a bit , the commiter chooses r 2 Z n at random and computes commit( ) := (?1) r 2 mod n: According to the quadratic residuocity assumption (see 13]), it is infeasible to decide whether commit( ) is a quadratic residue or not (i.e., whether = 1 or 0), unless one knows the factorization of n. Given a commitment commit( ) = (?1) r 2 mod n of a bit and a commitment commit( ) = (?1) s 2 mod n of a bit , it follows that commit( ) = (?1) r 2 s 2 mod n is an xor-commitment on . When opening this commit, one reveals rs mod n, which does not contain any information on s.
We denote the observer by O, the veri er by V and the user-module by U.
For clarity, we leave out the fact that to prevent shared information the secret and public keys must be shared between the observer and the user-module in a suitable way. It is not hard to see how to do this using some of the techniques suggested in 7].
In the protocol, O knows a square root X of X 2 mod n, and O wishes to convince V of this fact in such a way that U does not learn it, whereas U can be ensured that there is no shared information. V wants to be convinced not only of the fact that O knows a square root of X 2 mod n, but also that O is close by. In essence, this is the setting of the ma a fraud, with the intermediary party (P and V in ma a frauds, and U in this situation) also trying to prevent shared information.
The protocol is as follows (see Figure 8) Step 1 O generates k random numbers R i 2 R Z n and sends the squares R 2 i mod n of these numbers to U. O also generates k bits i , and sends a xorcommitment on them to U. (Clearly, if we use the speci c xor-commitment just described, a commitment for each bit would be needed.)
Step 2 U rst veri es that the numbers received from O all have Jacobi symbol 1. If this is the case, he generates at random k bits i 2 R f0; 1g as well as k bits i 2 R f0; 1g. U also generates k numbers S i 2 R Z n . He then computes the k products R 2 i S 2 i (X 2 ) i i mod n and sends them to V. U also sends xor-commitment(s) on i i to V.
Step 3 V generates k challenge bits i 2 R f0; 1g, which he will use for the rapid bit exchange.
Step 4 Now the rapid exchange of bits can take place. Hereto, the following four exchanges are repeated k times, for i = 1; : : : ; k: { V sends bit i to U. { U sends i i to O immediately after receiving i . { O sends challenge bit i to U immediately after receiving i i .
{ U sends i i to V immediately after receiving i .
Step 5 O opens the k commits on the bits i to U O also computes the k responses R i X i i i mod n and sends them to U.
Step 6 U veri es whether the responses of O are correct with respect to the chal- Although we write commit(: : : ; i ; : : : ;) we do not mean to imply with this that a multi-bit commitment must necessarily be used: one might as well use k single-bit commitments.
It is straightforward to show that V accepts if all parties follow the protocol, and that Propositions 2 and 3 hold.
Since one can easily show that for each view of V and for each view of O in this protocol, there is exactly one set of random choices that could have been made by U such that the views are from the same execution of the protocol, there is no shared information. Clearly, for the protocol as we described it, this only holds for executions concerning proof of knowledge of the particular number X 2 mod n. However, as we noted before, if the knowledge of X 2 mod n is divided between O and U in a suitable way (as described in 8]), the property of absence of shared information holds for the set of all proofs of knowledge, regardless of the particular number X 2 mod n that the proof is concerned with.
Finally, as in Proposition 3 it is easy to see that the following must hold. Proposition 4. If O and V follow the protocol, then U cannot (with probability of success greater than 1=2 k ) trick V into believing that O is close by if this is not the case.
As before, if at least one of O and V generates challenge bits according to a distribution other than the uniform one, then U's probability of successful cheating will only increase.
Open problems and further work
We would like to present two potentially fruitful areas for further investigation.
First is the physics and practical implementation of distance-bounding technology. We know little about the physical limits or precisely how best to use current technology. Some experimental work might also be interesting.
Second is dealing with a problem not adressed here. The techniques presented do not prevent frauds in which a distant party with access to the secret keys is cooperating with a party close by (without conveying the secret keys). The frauds were suggested informally under the name \the terrorist fraud" by Desmedt in 9]. We are currently working on some ideas preventing such frauds using distance bounding.
